Discrimination causes health inequities for stigmatized groups. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) individuals, in particular, are at significantly increased risk for disparate health outcomes when they reside in states that fail to extend equal protections to them or that actively deprive equal rights to them.
Several states and the federal government have proposed or enacted laws that permit residents to discriminate against LGBTQ individuals. One such law, Arkansas's Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act of 2015, preempts or prohibits local governments from enacting civil rights protections for LGBTQ individuals that are also lacking at the state level.
State laws such as Arkansas's undermine local control, damage the economy, and create injustices that harm LGBTQ people. I set forth 2 constitutional arguments to challenge such laws, and I provide information to help advocates support evidence-based policymaking and prevent the passage of similar laws in their states. Jennifer L. Pomeranz, JD, MPH I n the wake of the US Supreme Court's 2015 case holding that the US Constitution protects the right of same-sex couples to marry, Congress and state legislatures have proposed and enacted laws to protect people who disagree with this ruling. These laws take several forms, but they all foster inequities that are concerning for public health. One law of particular concern is Arkansas's Intrastate Commerce Improvement Act of 2015 (Act 137), which declares that its purpose is to improve intrastate commerce by requiring state uniformity for civil rights laws. 1 Specifically, the law preempts, or withdraws, the authority of local governments to provide increased protections to persons not mentioned in the state's civil rights act (which in Arkansas includes race, religion, national origin, gender, and disability). Arkansas does not protect lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender or queer (LGBTQ) individuals from discrimination. Therefore, the ultimate outcome of Act 137 is to ensure that local governments cannot enact civil rights protections for LGBTQ people in Arkansas. Act 137 was enacted after the city of Fayetteville, Arkansas, attempted to pass local civil rights protections for LGBTQ individuals; it has been challenged on constitutional grounds, and there are good arguments to support such a case. I focus on the lack of evidence to support passage of Act 137 or similar laws in other states and potential constitutional challenges to the Arkansas law itself.
Examining policies that prohibit increased civil rights protections to LGBTQ people aligns with the social justice values of public health. 2 Social justice drives public health to address health disparities, especially of minority groups, while pursuing the goal of promoting overall population health. 2 Discrimination is a social determinant of health. 3 Members of the LGBTQ community, in particular, may experience anxiety, fear, and hopelessness. Additionally, they face an increased risk for HIV/AIDS, certain cancers, suicidal ideation, and risk-taking behaviors. These risk-taking behaviors include smoking, alcohol consumption, substance use, and less frequent use of preventive health services than recommended. [4] [5] [6] This has been explained as a normal response to the stress processes of living with discrimination. 7 A powerful method to ameliorate this stress process is to institute protective policies, whereas a powerful method to exacerbate this stress process is to institute discriminatory policies. [8] [9] [10] [11] LGBTQ individuals are at a significantly increased risk for disparate health outcomes when they reside in states that fail to extend equal protections or that actively deprive equal rights to them. For example, Hatzenbuehler et al. found that for those living in states without policies extending protections against hate crimes and employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation there was a significant association between LGB status and generalized anxiety disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, chronic depression, and psychiatric comorbidity. 8 Hatzenbuehler et al.
similarly found that LGB respondents living in states with constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage had significant increases in mood, anxiety, and substance-use disorders. 9 
EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING
The World Economic Forum found that discrimination is "economically harmful" because it reduces the employee talent pool, decreases innovation, and burdens those stigmatized. 14 Thus, 484 of the Fortune 500 companies protect their employees against workplace discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 15 Absent statewide protections, localities should not be preempted from increasing civil rights protections, as they have historically played this role. In the 1940s and 1950s, municipalities enacted protections on the basis of race for housing, employment, restaurants, and all public accommodations before state and federal civil rights laws. As of February 2017, 223 cities and counties in 27 states prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 19 Preemption undermines this local control and grassroots movements and provides a barrier to more protective policies. 20 Local governments subject to similar preemptive laws should research their own home rule authority, which refers to the power by local governments to self-rule and enact their own laws, and locales should challenge state laws if they violate localities' right to self-govern.
BACKGROUND FOR ACT 137
Several state statutes are relevant for understanding the context of Arkansas Act 137 and the breadth of laws on the topic nationally. First, in 2015, Arkansas enacted a Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which mirrors the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act and prohibits the government from substantially burdening the exercise of religion (unless it furthers a compelling government interest using the least restrictive means). 21 Although Religious Freedom Restoration Acts might be useful to avoid government regulation that conflict with one's religious beliefs, such as the requirement that businesses provide health insurance coverage for contraception, 22 federal statutes cannot be used to violate one set of constitutional rights (e.g., equal protection) in an attempt to strengthen another (e.g., free exercise of religion). 23 Thus, Religious Freedom Restoration Acts cannot be used to justify discrimination. Second, Arkansas representatives in favor of Act 137 noted that Tennessee had enacted a similar law, which the Arkansas legislators mistakenly believed was upheld in court; instead, the case challenging this law was dismissed for lack of standing (the plaintiffs did not have a legally recognizable injury) without reaching constitutional questions. 24 Because constitutional scrutiny is fact specific, the legal challenges to Act 137 do not necessarily apply to the Tennessee law.
North Carolina enacted a law that prohibited people from using bathrooms that correlate with their gender identity rather than their biological sex at birth and that preempted inconsistent local laws. The state enacted a revised version in 2017 that maintained preemption and provided no increased protection to transgender persons. 25 Mississippi law prohibits government from penalizing individuals acting on their religious beliefs that marriage is the union of 1 man and 1 woman, sexual relations are reserved for such a marriage, or gender is an individual's immutable biological sex at birth. A federal district court held that Mississippi's law violates the Establishment and Equal Protection clauses, but in 2017 the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the lawsuit and dismissed the case. 26 The difficulty in challenging Arkansas's Act 137 is that courts are reluctant to attribute unconstitutional motives to states when they are not explicit. 27 The text of Act 137 professes to have economic and secular purposes: to improve intrastate commerce. 1 Thus, if challenged, a court might simply find that it is neutral on its face and thus constitutional. However, for both Establishment and Equal Protection Clause challenges, the Supreme Court deems the legislative history relevant to determine if the government acted constitutionally.
In the Arkansas State House of Representatives, there was 30 minutes of floor debate from which to glean legislative intent (5 Representatives spoke in favor, and 3 against, the bill) 28 ; there is no recorded testimony from the Senate floor. The legislative history, which includes this House floor testimony, the context surrounding passage of Act 137, and concurrent media reports, 16, 29 supports the argument that Act 137 should be found unconstitutional under the Establishment and Equal Protection clauses.
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ARGUMENT AGAINST ACT 137
The Establishment Clause prohibits the government from enacting laws respecting an establishment of religion. The Supreme Court has relied on a variety of tests and rationales to determine if a government act or law violates the Establishment Clause, with certain tests applying to specific fact patterns not present here. Notwithstanding detractors on the Supreme Court, when a law is neutral on its face, the primary test courts rely on to determine potential violations of the Establishment Clause is the test developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 27, 30 In Lemon, the Supreme Court announced the following 3 tests, collectively referred to as the "Lemon" test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive governmental entanglement with religion."
13
A government action violating any of these tests will be found unconstitutional. In Establishment Clause cases, courts routinely look beyond the statutory language; they examine the legislative record to determine whether the government violated these tests.
31

First Lemon Test
The first Lemon test asks whether the statute has a secular legislative purpose. Act 137 purports to have been enacted to improve intrastate commerce. 1 This secular legislative purpose is to be given judicial deference "unless that purpose is insincere or a sham." 31 To determine purpose, the Supreme Court has considered the statute's text, legislative history, historical context, "and the specific sequence of events leading to its passage." 27 The Supreme Court has explained that the "'purpose' requirement" aims to prevent the governmental decisionmaker "from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters." 32 Thus, courts take the true purpose seriously to ensure that "an implausible claim" of secular governmental purpose does not carry the day in court.
27
The Supreme Court applied Lemon's first test in Edwards v. Aguillard, for example, to find that Louisiana's Creationism Act-which forbid teaching the theory of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction in "creation science"-violated the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court explained that although "the Act's stated purpose is to protect academic freedom," the court "could not ignore that 'the statute was a product of the upsurge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor'" that viewed this scientific theory as contradicting the Bible. 31 The court reviewed the legislative history and the intent of the bill's sponsor to determine that the purpose was not secular, but rather a "state interest in protecting particular religions from scientific views 'distasteful to them.'"
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If challenged in court, Arkansas could argue that Act 137 was enacted for the secular purpose of creating uniformity in the law applicable to businesses throughout the state. However, the floor debates in the Arkansas House of Representatives and the media accounts in the state associated with passage of Act 137 reveal that a primary justification for this purpose was to protect the "religious beliefs" and "religious convictions" of certain business owners in Arkansas; these business owners wanted the "freedom to discriminate" against "members of the LGBT community." 28 One representative stated:
The reason we are bringing this forth is because little businesses out there . . . a baker that loves the word of God should [not] have her business destroyed because she doesn't want to bake a cake for someone who is a transgender trying to marry somebody else. 28 Another representative stated:
I feel like if you were to ask the baker, if you were to ask the wedding planner, if you ask the different people . . . [who] have been attacked because of their religious beliefs . . . I believe they would tell you that they feel like this is very much needed. 28 There was no testimony on how preempting local civil rights statutes would improve intrastate commerce. Indeed, the actual purpose and expected outcome is to reduce commercial transactions between accommodated religious business owners and LGBTQ persons, and reducing commercial transitions is not associated with economic improvement. Interestingly, research released in 2014, before the House debate, indicates that same-sex marriage would bring $13.6 million in revenue to Arkansas over a 3-year period 33 ; this indicates that encouraging
LGBTQ marriages would more likely improve intrastate commerce. The legislative history seems to be void of a plausible secular purpose and more likely reflects the state's attempt to protect particular religions from views "'distasteful to them.'" 31
Second Lemon Test
Act 137 is also vulnerable under Lemon's second test. Under this test, the law's principal effect must not advance religion. 13 This means that although a state may accommodate religious beliefs, it cannot advance religion through its own activities, especially if it would pose significant burdens on nonadherents. 31, 34 For example, in Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, the Supreme Court struck down a Connecticut statute that guaranteed employees the right not to work on any day of the week they consider their Sabbath. The Supreme Court found that the religious employees' beliefs unconstitutionally controlled over all other business interests, including inconveniences and economic burdens on the employer and other employees. 34 The Supreme Court explained that the state cannot give "the force of law" to a person's religious belief and require accommodation by others "regardless of the burden." 32 Even if Arkansas was simply seeking to accommodate religion, Act 137 imposes economic and other burdens on LGBTQ persons and their families to advance the religious beliefs of those accommodated. Through Act 137, the state is giving the force of law to religious business owners who wish to discriminate against same-sex couples. Thus, the statute goes further than constitutionally appropriate to accommodate religious beliefs.
Third Lemon Test
Under the third test, the statute must not foster excessive government entanglement with religion. Although entanglement is more routinely found when there is an "intimate and continuing relationship between church and state," the goal of this test is to avoid politicizing religion. 13 In Lemon, the Supreme Court explained that religiousbased policies put politicians in a position of being forced to declare, and voters to choose, according to their faith. 13 Yet, "political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect." 13 There is a valid argument that Act 137 implicates this type of entanglement. In fact, during the floor debate, one of the representatives declared twice that she was a Christian while testifying in favor of the bill. 28 Because the state's law needs to fail only 1 Lemon test, Act 137 should be found to violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court has stated:
By showing a purpose to favor religion, the government sends the message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members.
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Such is the case for Act 137, and this message has broader health implications for those cast as "outsiders."
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EQUAL PROTECTION ARGUMENT AGAINST ACT 137
The Equal Protection Clause says that no state shall deny any person the equal protection of the law. Usually equal protection challenges involve a law that classifies people in a discriminatory manner. Act 137 does not classify people in the traditional sense, but rather makes it impossible for local governments to protect groups of people. In the context of race discrimination, when the Supreme Court is faced with a facially neutral statute, it looks behind the statute's language to determine if "discrimination was a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor behind enactment of the law." 35 If this is shown, the government must prove that it would have enacted the law regardless of the discriminatory purpose, and in these instances, courts will analyze the justification to determine if it is valid.
If a law does not create "suspect" classifications by targeting specific groups of persons (e.g., on the basis of race) or burden "fundamental rights" (e.g., the right to marry), it is examined under a test that is the easiest for government to pass: rational basis review. 36 This test states that a law is valid if it "is rationally related to a legitimate state interest." 37 
Rational Basis Review
Rational basis review is normally extremely deferential to the government, especially for social and economic policy, because the Supreme Court presumes that legislatures will eventually correct improvident decisions. 36 The Supreme Court has gone so far as to say that it would uphold a law "if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis" for it. 37 This amounts to no judicial review at all. However, the Supreme Court provides an exception when there is "some reason to infer antipathy." 37 In cases in which it is argued that the government acted with discriminatory intent, courts review the legislative history, including contemporary statements by members of the decision-making body.
38
For example, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the city denied a zoning permit for a group home for people with mental disabilities.
36
The city offered rationales for its ordinance but the Supreme Court found that the record did not reveal any rational basis for the distinction, noting that "negative attitudes, or fear" were "not permissible bases" for the decision. 36 Similarly, in USDA v. Moreno, the Supreme Court analyzed the rationale for requiring food stamps participants in the same household to be family. 39 The Supreme Court found little explanation for this requirement except a statement by one senator that the provision intended to prevent "'hippies' and 'hippie communes'" from participating in the program. 39 The Supreme Court found that this classification could not be sustained, stating:
If the constitutional conception of "equal protection of the laws" means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest. 39 In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court employed the reasoning from Moreno to strike down a Colorado law that prohibited the state and all local governments from providing equal protections explicitly to LGB individuals. 12 In applying rational basis review, the Supreme Court found that the various justifications Colorado put forth to support its law were "divorced from any factual context" and that the only explanation for the law was the "bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group," which "cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest." 12 Thus, the law failed rational basis review because animus is not considered a legitimate state interest.
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Application of Equal Protection to Act 137
It was well documented in the legislative history that Arkansas enacted Act 137 after Fayetteville attempted to pass local civil rights protections for LGBTQ individuals. 28 The senator who sponsored the law in the Senate reported to the media that he found it "infuriating" that the city attempted to pass this legislation because he did not want LGBTQ individuals "to have special rights." 29 Arkansas could argue that the need for uniformity is still a legitimate state interest to improve intrastate commerce and the preemption of local civil rights statutes is rationally related to that interest. This argument is not supported by facts. Neither the act nor the floor debate identified any commercial or economic problem within Arkansas in general or specifically related to nonuniformity of civil rights law, and no legislator provided evidence that uniformity would improve commerce. Moreover, the sponsor of the bill in the House stated that he was "all about home rule," but he did not explain why the absence of home rule here was necessary. 28 In fact, the sponsor of the bill in the House admitted that the Romer decision and Colorado law in that case, "is what shapes" Act 137. 28 He differentiated the Colorado law struck down in Romer from the Arkansas bill, stating that the Arkansas act would be "equally applied to everybody," unlike the Colorado amendment, which would have allowed "no protection for these groups of people." 28 The statement that the decision in Romer and underlying Colorado law shaped the Arkansas act can be interpreted to mean that although the statute is targeting the same "groups of people," it was drafted to bypass protections afforded by the Equal Protection Clause by not specifying that the target was LGBTQ individuals. Furthermore, the legislative history made the purpose clear. Representatives wanted uniformity to enable "the baker," the "wedding planner," and other business owners to be able to refuse serving LGBTQ people throughout the state. 28 Or as one Representative clarified: "Lesbians, gay, bisexual, transgender, those are the things that we are talking about." 28 Such a discriminatory purpose reflects the same "animus," or "bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group" as has been found not to be a legitimate government interest in previous cases. Act 137 should be found to violate the Equal Protection Clause. It is also important to note that there is a strong argument that laws targeting LGBTQ persons may become subject to heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause in the future, and thus more vulnerable to failing in court. 40 The Supreme Court has stated that heightened review is appropriate when a group has experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" and the unequal classification is on the basis of a characteristic "beyond the individual's control and bears no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society." 37 These rationales apply to LGBTQ individuals. In fact, in US v. Windsor, President Obama refused to defend the federal definition of marriage that excluded same-sex partners from being considered spouses on the basis of his conclusion that "given a number of factors, including a documented history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to a heightened standard of scrutiny."
23 On the basis of Romer and Windsor, some federal appellate courts have already begun to apply heightened scrutiny to classifications on the basis of sexual orientation. 40 As courts move in this direction, discriminatory actions may receive more constitutional protection if challenged in court.
SUMMARY OF CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
By analyzing the legislative record and context, it is clear that Act 137 was proposed and enacted in response to the city of Fayetteville's attempt to provide increased civil rights protections to LGBTQ persons and the Supreme Court's decisions related to same-sex marriage. Act 137 intends to further religiously based animus toward LGBTQ individuals, and the purported secular interests are insincere. As stated best by a representative who opposed the law:
If we pass this bill, we're basically saying that the freedom to discriminate on the part of a business is more important than the freedoms of the other two groups . . . cities and counties of Arkansas [to self-legislate and] members of the LGBT community
[who] can be fired from their jobs without consequence; . . . evicted from their homes, without consequence; [and] have no protections under Arkansas law. 28 Act 137 should be found to violate both the Establishment and Equal Protection clauses.
Even without a successful legal challenge to the law, which requires resources and a plaintiff with standing, the arguments and additional evidence provided can be used to convince legislators in other states not to enact such a law in the first place. State legislators understand that they have a "fiduciary obligation to be good stewards of state resources," 28 which should translate into avoiding putting the state in a position to defend its laws in court.
CONCLUSIONS
From a public health policy perspective, ensuring that states enact laws that increase protections for LGBTQ individuals, rather than create barriers to those laws, is of the utmost importance. Arkansas's preemptive legislation undermines local control, damages the economy, and creates injustices that harm the health of LGBTQ individuals and undermine other public health efforts aimed at addressing health disparities. States should avoid enacting discriminatory legislation regardless of its legality, but in the case of Arkansas, Act 137 should be deemed unconstitutional.
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